Resource title

A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation

Resource description

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert knowledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen’s ‘liberal paradox’. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions.

Resource author

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

en

Resource content type

application/pdf

Resource resource URL

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5802/1/A_liberal_paradox_for_judgment_aggregation_%28LSERO%29.pdf

Resource license