Resource title

Simultaneity, asymmetric devolution and economic incentives in Spanish regional elections

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Simultaneity, asymmetric devolution and economic incentives in Spanish regional elections

Resource description

This paper addresses two hypotheses. The first is that holding two or more elections at the same time is an institutional device to legitimize newly created regional governments by ensuring an acceptable electoral turnout at their formation. The second is that regional elections provide a participation incentive in relatively poor regions. The study draws upon evidence from the first round of Spanish regional elections (1980–99) when Spanish devolution was still asymmetrical. It empirically examines whether calling simultaneous elections for the European, national, regional and local parliaments and councils increased the aggregate voter turnout. Secondly, it tests whether regional income, inflation and unemployment rates influenced voter turnout. Its findings indicate that calling simultaneous elections can boost electoral turnout for newly created governments. Less affluent autonomous regions exhibited higher turnout—arguably due to a heavier reliance on regional government activity.

Resource author

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

en

Resource content type

Resource resource URL

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22941/

Resource license