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Consumption and savings with unemployment risk: implications for optimal employment contracts

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This paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation to smooth consumption during employment without causing moral hazard. A preannounced delay in dismissal when the job becomes unproductive provides further insurance but because of moral hazard it does not fully smooth consumption. During the delay consumption falls and the worker searches for another job. No delays in dismissals are optimal if exogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous.

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en

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application/pdf

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2211/1/Consumption_and_savings_with_unemployment_risk_%28LSERO%29.pdf

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