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The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

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Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agen- das of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or e¤ectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation repres- ented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is e¤ectively dictatorial.

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en

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application/pdf

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20067/1/The_impossibility_of_unbiased_judgment_aggregation_%28LSERO%29.pdf

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