Resource title

Corporate espionage

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Corporate espionage

Resource description

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.

Resource author

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Sudipta Sarangi

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27377

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.