Resource title

Upfront payments and listing decisions

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Upfront payments and listing decisions

Resource description

We analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the higher her bargaining power and the higher the number of potential suppliers. Upfront payments tend to lower the number of products offered by the retailer when the products are rather close substitutes. However, upfront payments can increase social welfare if they ameliorate inefficient listing decisions implied by short-term contracts only.

Resource author

Pio Baake, Vanessa von Schlippenbach

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27317

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.