Resource title

Optimal taxation: the design of child related cash- and in-kind-benefits

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Resource description

This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer systems. Based on the theory of optimal taxation, combined with microsimulation and microeconometric techniques we derive the welfare function which makes the current German tax and transfer system for single women optimal. Furthermore, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and assess how reforms of in-kind childcare transfers would affect the welfare function. This analysis allows us to derive conclusions about the optimal design of child related transfers and in-kind benefits.

Resource author

Peter Haan, Katharina Wrohlich

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27261

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.