Resource title

The (de)composition of firms: interdependent preferences of corporate actors

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Resource description

This article discusses the limitations of the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Various experimental studies have shown that the aggregation of individuals in groups changes behavior and preferences systematically. This perspective has been formalized by models of interdependent preferences. Based on a prominent approach of interdependent preferences, intention-based preferences, two types of labor contracts, incentive contracts and bonus contracts, are analyzed. Results are compared with the predictions of the orthodox economic theory.

Resource author

Andreas Nicklisch

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Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26935

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Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.