Resource title

Noisy commitments: the impact of information accuracy on efficiency

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Noisy commitments: the impact of information accuracy on efficiency

Resource description

We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not affect efficiency. We find that accurate commitments promote efficiency, as expected by game theory. However, noisy commitments are found to impair efficiency. We explain this effect by the differences between incentives off the equilibrium path under conditions of accurate commitments and noisy commitments. This difference changes the game structure and in the current game facilitates more random responses.

Resource author

Eyal Ert, Andreas Nicklisch

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26888

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.