Resource title

Electoral control when policies are for sale

Resource image

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Resource description

This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], Protection for sale, American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment.

Resource author

Etienne Farvaque, Gaƫl Lagadec

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26567

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.