Resource title

On myopia as rationale for social security

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Resource description

This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.

Resource author

Torben M. Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26446

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.