Resource title

Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator

Resource image

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Resource description

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.

Resource author

Anne van Aaken, Lars P. Feld, Stefan Voigt

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26290

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.