Resource title

Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

Resource description

A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.

Resource author

José Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler, Simon Weidenholzer

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26269

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.