Resource title

Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences

Resource description

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.

Resource author

Laszlo Goerke

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26257

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.