Resource title

Majority-efficiency and competition-efficiency in a binary policy model

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image for OpenScout resource :: Majority-efficiency and competition-efficiency in a binary policy model

Resource description

We introduce a general framework in which politicians choose a (possibly infinite) sequence of binary policies. The two competing candidates are exogenously committed to particular actions on a subset of these issues, while they can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Citizens have general preferences over policies, and the distribution of preferences may be uncertain. We show that a special case of the model, the weighted-issue model, provides a tractable multidimensional model of candidate competition that can generate (i) policy divergence in pure and mixed strategies, (ii) adoption of minority positions, and (iii) inefficient outcomes.

Resource author

Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26003

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.