Resource title

Competition for viewers and advertisers in a TV oligopoly

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Competition for viewers and advertisers in a TV oligopoly

Resource description

We consider a model of a TV oligopoly where TV channels transmit advertising and viewers dislike such commercials. We show that advertisers make a lower profit the larger the number of TV channels. If TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes, there will be underprovision of advertising relative to social optimum. We also find that the more viewers dislike ads, the more likely it is that welfare is increasing in the number of advertising financed TV channels. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than private TV channels. It may even have advertising in cases where advertising is wasteful per se.

Resource author

Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen, Lars Sørgard

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25907

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.