Resource title

Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition

Resource description

High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation.

Resource author

Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. Konrad

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25836

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.