Resource title

The chopstick auction: a study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions

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Resource description

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the chopstick auction in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is less efficient than the second-price sealed-bid auction and that it yields more [the same] revenue if bidders are inexperienced [experienced].

Resource author

Florian Englmaier, Pablo Guillén, Loreto Llorente, Sander Onderstal, Rupert Sausgruber

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25827

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.