Resource title

Workfare, monitoring, and efficiency wages

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Workfare, monitoring, and efficiency wages

Resource description

The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Utility levels of employed workers and welfare recipients may increase even if the net wage declines. The utility differential between these two groups of workers shrinks.

Resource author

Christian Holzner, Volker Meier, Martin Werding

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25794

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.