Resource title

Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment

Resource description

In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.

Resource author

Werner Güth, Maria Vittoria Levati, Torsten Weiland

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25649

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.