Resource title

The Basel II accord: internal ratings and bank defferentiation

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Resource description

The Basel Committee plans to differentiate risk-adjusted capital requirements between banks regulated under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach and banks under the standard approach. We investigate the consequences for the lending capacity and the failure risk of banks in a model with endogenous interest rates. The optimal regulatory response depends on the banks inclination to increase their portfolio risk. If IRB-banks are well-capitalized or gain little from taking risks, then they will increase their market share and hold safe portfolios. As risk-taking incentives become more important, the optimal portfolio size of banks adopting intern rating systems will be increasingly constrained, and ultimately they may lose market share relative to banks using the standard approach. The regulator has only limited options to avoid the excessive adoption of internal rating systems.

Resource author

Eberhard Fees, Ulrich Hege

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25415

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.