Resource title

Are CEOs in family firms paid like bureaucrats?: evidence from Bayesian and frequentist analyses

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Resource description

The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is found that the share of base salary is higher with family-member CEOs than it is with nonfamily member CEOs. Furthermore, family-member CEOs receive a lower share of option pay. The paper's findings have implications for family business research and the executive compensation literature. To make the findings robust, the statistical analysis is performed with both Bayesian and classical frequentist methods.

Resource author

Jörn Hendrich Block

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25275

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.