Resource title

Rules, discretion or reputation?: monetary policies and the efficiency of financial markets in Germany, 14th to 16th centuries

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Rules, discretion or reputation?: monetary policies and the efficiency of financial markets in Germany, 14th to 16th centuries

Resource description

This paper examines the questions of whether and how feudal rulers were able to credibly commit to preserving monetary stability, and of which consequences their decisions had for the efficiency of financial markets. The study reveals that princes were usually only able to commit to issuing a stable coinage in gold, but not in silver. As for silver currencies, the hypothesis is that transferring the right of coinage to an autonomous city was the functional equivalent to establishing an independent central bank. An analysis of market performance indicates that financial markets between cities that were autonomous with regard to their monetary policies were significantly better integrated and more efficient than markets between cities whose currencies were supplied by a feudal ruler.

Resource author

Oliver Volckart

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25179

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.