Resource title

Cheap talk in the classroom

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Cheap talk in the classroom

Resource description

In this paper, I offer a theoretical explanation of the robust gender differences in educational achievement distributions of school children. I consider a shot cheap talk game with two different types of senders (biased teachers and fair teachers), two types of receivers (normal and special pupils) and uncertainty about the sender type on the side of the receiver. I demonstrate that the group of pupils who, in expectation, get either too much or too little encouragement will have less top achievers and a lower average achievement than the group of pupils who get a more accurate feedback message, even if the prior talent distribution is the same for both groups of pupils.

Resource author

Lydia Mechtenberg, Roland Strausz

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language


Resource content type


Resource resource URL

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.