Resource title

Entry Deterrence in Postal Service Markets

Resource image

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Resource description

In this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whether entry is deterred or accommodated.

Resource author

Patrick Frank Ernst Beschorner

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.