Resource title

Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK

Resource description

This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France and the UK. Large boards facilitate disciplining, but the role of non-executives is ambiguous.

Resource author

Isabelle Dherment-Ferere, Jens Köke, Luc Renneboog

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24444

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.