Resource title

Mandated benefits, welfare, and heterogeneous firms

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Mandated benefits, welfare, and heterogeneous firms

Resource description

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers? insurance, and may also redistribute in favor of more "deserving" workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts - separating the various worker types - the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be mitigated by restricting mandates to "large" firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision may be superior to mandates by virtue of preserving separations.

Resource author

John T. Addison, Charles Richard Barrett, William Stanley Siebert

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24288

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.