Resource title

Double Taxation, Tax Credits and the Information Exchange Puzzle

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Resource description

This paper analyzes the choice of taxes and international information exchange by governments in a capital tax competition model. We explain situations where countries can choose tax rates on tax savings income and exchange information about the domestic savings of foreigners, implying that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. However, we also identify situations with adverse welfare properties in which information exchange is compatible with zero taxes on capital income. The model helps to identify the linkage between voluntary information exchange and the choice of tax rates. It is shown that the recent development in information exchange treaties may not be useful to overcome the inefficiencies caused by decentralized tax setting.

Resource author

Wolfgang Eggert

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23557

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.