Resource title

The new institutional economics of antitrust and regulation

Resource image

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Resource description

Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the economics of complex vertical and horizontal coordination problems. It sketches the specific view of NIE at industrial organization, antitrust and regulation, discusses three current issues – the European policy concerning complex vertical contracts, regulatory reform of the electricity industry and the allocation of regulatory competencies in the EU – and presents some implications of NIE for economic policy making, research and advisory activities.

Resource author

Frank Bickenbach, Lars Kumkar, Rüdiger Soltwedel

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2355

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.