Resource title

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Resource image

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Resource description

We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this ?overjustification effect? can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one?s generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.

Resource author

Roland BĂ©nabou, Jean Tirole

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

deu

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23457

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.