Resource title

Anti-Sharing.

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Anti-Sharing.

Resource description

The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the output is produced, each team member receives a gross payment that equals the actual team output. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium exists in which each team member chooses first-best effort. We call this mechanism ?Anti-Sharing? since it solves the sharing problem that causes the inefficiency in teams. The Anti-Sharing mechanism requires one player to specialize on the role of an ?Anti-Sharer?. With an external Anti-Sharer who works on a non-profit base, the mechanism can implement first-best effort. If, however, the Anti-Sharer comes from within the team and desires a positive payoff, then the mechanism may implement not more than second-best effort. The latter version of the model could be interpreted as a new theory of firms and partnerships in the sense of the theory of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).

Resource author

Roland Kirstein, Robert Cooter

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23131

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.