Resource title

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

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Resource description

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

Resource author

Dieter Schmidtchen, Bernard Steunenberg

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23127

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.