Resource title

Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Imperfect Decision-Making and the Tax Payer Puzzle

Resource description

Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax morale". Our paper models tax payers as imperfect decision-makers and explains deviations from the optimal solution by making use of a weaker assumption: The imperfect tax payer's decision to deviate from a given rule depends on their competence and on the complexity of their situation.

Resource author

Dieter Schmidtchen, Roland Kirstein

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23053

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.