Resource title

Rational Samaritans, Strategic Moves, and Rule-Governed Behavior: Some Remarks on James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma"

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Using James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" as a basic example, this paper analyses the problems that have to be solved if strategic behavior is necessary to escape from dilemma situations by changing the opponents' incentives. These problems are addressed within one-shot games as well as repeated games. Furthermore, the implications resulting from the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are analyzed. By using the concept of finite automata to model strategies for supergames, the possible relations with evolutionary game theory are spelled out. ; Dieser Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel von James Buchanans "Samariter-Dilemma" die Probleme, die es zu lösen gilt, wenn "strategisches Verhalten" im Sinne der Veränderung von Handlungsanreizen durch glaubhafte Drohungen und Versprechen notwendig ist, um Dilemmasituationen zu vermeiden. Dabei werden neben den grundelgenden Strukturen "Einmalspiel" und "Superspiel" auch die Besonderheiten der Annahme von "common knowledge" analysiert, und mit dem Konzept der als finite Automaten abbildbaren Superspielstrategien Brücken zur evolutorischen Spieltheorie geschlagen.

Resource author

Christian Koboldt

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Resource language

eng

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text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23049

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Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.