Resource title

Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages

Resource description

Consider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the efficiency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable effort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by costly workplace surveillance. It is argued that a privacy protection law preventing surveillance may increase the total surplus. While such a law reduces the employer?s profit, this loss can be overcompensated by the employee?s gain, because the employer invests in surveillance not only to implement higher effort, but also to reduce the employee?s rent.

Resource author

Patrick W. Schmitz

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22931

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.