Resource title

Rent seeking in sequential group contests

Resource image

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Resource description

In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is higher than in an individual contest. However, if the order of moves is endogenized, the smaller group will always act prior to the bigger group. Competition between the groups is in this way weakened and the groups are able to save on expenditures.

Resource author

Oliver G├╝rtler

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22908

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.