Resource title

The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder?s Value is Commonly Known

Resource image

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Resource description

We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an inefficient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser, increases (reduces) the inefficiency of the market when the buyer with the commonly known value is weak (strong). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue.

Resource author

Thomas Tröger

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22902

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.