Resource title

Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents

Resource image

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Resource description

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents? strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral.

Resource author

Peter-Jürgen Jost, Matthias Kräkel

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.