Resource title

An experimental test of career concerns

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: An experimental test of career concerns

Resource description

Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers' behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on, and this explains the dearth of empirical studies. We provide experimental evidence that the signal jamming mechanism works in a laboratory setting. Moreover, subjects' beliefs fit remarkably well requirements imposed by the Bayesian equilibrium concept.

Resource author

Albrecht Morgenstern, Alexander Karl Koch, Philippe Raab

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22897

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.