Resource title

Cournot Competition between Teams : An Experimental Study

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Resource description

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of teamorganization such that teams and individuals are behaviorally equivalent providing a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments in contrast to analog experimental results on price-competition in the literature.

Resource author

Burkhard C. Schipper, Philippe Raab

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22891

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.