Resource title

Curbing Power or Progress? : Governing with an Opposition Veto

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Curbing Power or Progress? : Governing with an Opposition Veto

Resource description

Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. "divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the governments special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better.

Resource author

Albrecht Morgenstern

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22888

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.