Resource title

Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction

Resource image

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Resource description

In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the foundation of the property-rights theory: I characterize under which circumstances its predictions are correct when trade is contractible. Second, I study how the optimal use of the incentive instruments depends on the environment. This is in the spirit of the multitasking literature. Finally, the model produces implications of the property-rights theory that are empirically testable.

Resource author

Andreas Roider

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22823

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.