Resource title

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

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Resource description

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments.

Resource author

Anke Reichhuber, Eva Camacho Cuena, Till Requate

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22061

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.