Resource title

Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

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Resource description

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Resource author

James Albrecht, Jan C. van Ours

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Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.