Resource title

Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments

Resource image

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Resource description

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.

Resource author

Peter-Jürgen Jost, Matthias Kräkel

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21001

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.