Resource title

Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams

Resource image

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Resource description

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser?s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.

Resource author

Matthias Kräkel

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20909

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.