Resource title

Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence

Resource description

In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.

Resource author

Leif Danziger, Shoshana Neuman

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20621

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.