Resource title

Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

Resource description

We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.

Resource author

James Albrecht, Pieter A. Gautier, Susan Vroman

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20487

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.