Resource title

Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in Asymmetric

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Resource description

This paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms? performance. Despite an exante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial skills to firms tends to be asymmetric. This sorting outcome determines both the goods market structure at single locations and the size distribution of firms. Results are consistent with a number of observed patterns regarding the size distribution of firms and establishments, and the relation of firm size to profitability, productivity, managerial skills and manager remuneration.

Resource author

Volker Grossmann

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20430

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.