Resource title

Unemployment and employment protection in a unionized economy with search frictions

Resource image

image for OpenScout resource :: Unemployment and employment protection in a unionized economy with search frictions

Resource description

In theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal.

Resource author

Nikolai Stähler

Resource publisher

Resource publish date

Resource language

eng

Resource content type

text/html

Resource resource URL

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19681

Resource license

Adapt according to the presented license agreement and reference the original author.